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IN SEARCH OF "GOOD POSITIVE REASONS" 
FOR AN ETHICS OF DIVINE COMMANDS: 
A CATALOGUE OF ARGUMENTS 
J anine Marie Idziak 
Recent proponents of a divine command ethics have chiefly defended the theory by refuting 
objections rather than by offering "positive reasons" to support it. We here offer a cata-
logue of such positive arguments drawn from historical discussions of the theory. We pre-
sent arguments which focus on various properties of the divine nature and on the unique 
status of God, as well as arguments which are analogical in character. Finally, we describe a 
particularform of the theory to which these arguments point, and indicate how they counter-
act a standard criticism of it. Throughout we pick up on previous work of Philip Quinn. 
During the last several decades there has been renewed interest on the part of 
philosophers and theologians in an ethics of divine commands. Most basically, a 
divine command moralist holds that the standard of right and wrong is the com-
mands and prohibitions of God. According to the divine command theory, "an 
action of kind of action is right or wrong if and only if and because it is com-
manded or forbidden by God."l In other words, the theory stipulates that "what 
ultimately makes an action right or wrong is its being commanded or forbidden by 
God and nothing else."2 According to a divine command moralist, it is not the 
case that God commands a particular action because it is right, or prohibits it 
because it is wrong; rather, an action is right (or wrong) because God commands 
(or prohibits) it. 
The defense of any ethical theory operates on two levels: the refutation of 
objections which may be brought against the theory, and the presentation of rea-
sons in support of the position and for preferring it to other ethical systems. Recent 
proponents of divine command ethics have, for the most part, chosen the former 
strategy of defense. In fact, in the first contemporary monographic study of divine 
command ethics, Divine Commands and Moral Requirements, Philip Quinn 
explicitly states that he does not try to answer the question whether there are "good 
positive reasons for believing that a version of divine command theory is true. "1 
The historical literature in general is richer in this regard, offering a variety of 
putatively "good positive reasons" for adopting an ethics of divine commands. 
Our aim in this paper is to present and call attention to these historical argu-
ments, drawn from discussions of the divine command theory in late medieval 
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philosophy and theology, in Refonnation and in Puritan theology, and in British 
modem philosophy. Some of the sources on which we will draw have hitherto 
gone unnoticed in the recent published literature on the divine command theory. 
Although we will not here undertake a critical evaluation of the arguments in 
question but simply set them out, our catalogue is meant to be suggestive to 
philosophers and theologians interested in the divine command theory and hence 
a prolegomenon to further attempts to defend it. 
As well as considering particular arguments, we will attempt to discern some 
basic strategies for the positive defense of the theory. In sections I and II we 
consider arguments which connect an ethics of divine commands with various 
properties of the divine nature. In section III we look at a line of argument 
centering on the unique status occupied by God. Arguments which are analogical 
in nature are examined in section IV. Finally, in section V we consider some 
wider implications of these arguments. Specifically, we describe a particular 
fonn of divine command theory to which some of these arguments point, and 
suggest that the body of historical arguments we have delineated serves to coun-
teract one of the standard criticisms leveled against an ethics of divine commands. 
I 
The citation of authorities is a familiar element of the medieval style of 
argumentation, and discussions of the divine command theory from this period 
are no exception. Authoritative statements apparently favoring an ethics of divine 
commands were brought forward from the writings of Augustine", Ambrose, 5 
Gregory the Great,6 the Pseudo-Cyprian ,7 , Isidore of Seville, 8 Hugh of St. Victor, 9 
and Anselm. \0 
Such authoritative statements not infrequently represent mere assertions of a 
viewpoint or stance, rather than the presentation of reasons or evidence, properly 
speaking, for a position. From the point of view of the task at hand, that is, of 
searching for "positive reasons" for an ethics of divine commands, the most 
interesting of the authoritative statements comes from Hugh of St. Victor's On 
the Sacraments. We quote in its entirety the section of the text from which 
various quotations were taken: 
The first cause of all things is the will of the Creator which no 
antecedent cause moved because it is eternal, nor any subsequent cause 
confinns because it is of itself just. For He did not will justly, because 
what He willed was to be just, but what He willed was just, because 
He Himself willed it. For it is peculiar to Himself and to His will that 
that which is His is just; from Him comes the justice that is in His will 
by the very fact that justice comes from His will. That which is just is 
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just according to His will and certainly would not be just, if it were not 
according to His will. When, therefore, it is asked how that is just 
which is just, the most fitting answer will be: because it is according 
to the will of God, which is just. When, however, it is asked how the 
will of God itself is also just, this quite reasonable answer will be given: 
because there is no cause of the first cause, whose prerogative it is to 
be what it is of itself. But this alone is the cause whence whatever is 
has originated, and it itself did not originate, but is eternal. II 
49 
This text suggests a connection between the dependency of what is just on the 
divine will and God's recognized status as first and uncaused cause. Although 
the text is somewhat obscure, it bears the following interpretation. When trying 
to determine what is just, we look to what accords with the will of God, for the 
divine will is considered to be paradigmatic ally just. Now in seeking the foun-
dation of justice, it does not make sense to seek something else beyond the 
divine will. For the divine will is the first cause of all things, and as such, it is 
uncaused and has no cause prior to it. Thus, there is no cause of the justness of 
the divine will; rather, the divine will itself generates justness. 
The text from On the Sacraments takes on additional significance from the 
point of view of subsequent discussions of divine command ethics. The connection 
suggested by Hugh of St. Victor between an ethics of divine commands and 
God's status as first cause and uncaused cause is a connection which recurs in 
the historical literature, in somewhat varying forms. 
In On Truth, Thomas Aquinas raises the issue of an ethics of divine commands 
in asking the question whether justice as found among created things depends 
simply upon the divine Will. 12 One of the arguments mentioned by Aquinas in 
favor of an affirmative answer to this question, and hence in favor of an ethics 
of divine commands, invokes the conception of God as first cause: Justice, as 
a certain correctness, depends on the imitation of some rule; the rule of the effect 
is its due cause; therefore, since the first cause of all things is the divine will, 
it is also the first rule from which everything just is judged. 13 Another of the 
arguments reported by Aquinas as supporting the divine command position 
involves the uncaused nature of the divine will. Thus he makes mention of the 
contention that every will which is just by a principle other than itself is such 
that its principle should be sought; however, since Augustine has pointed out 
that the cause of God's will is not to be sought, it seems we must conclude that 
the principle of justice depends on no other than the divine will. 14 
The connection in question is also found in Reformation and early Protestant 
theology. Whatever may be the best interpretation of the ethics of Luther and 
Calvin overall, there are passages to be found in their writings which are indicative 
of an ethics of divine commands. Such statements of a divine command theory 
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are at times contextually intertwined with statements about the uncaused nature 
of God's wiJI. This juxtaposition is unmistakable in a passage from Martin 
Luther's The Bondage of the Will, in which assertions of the uncaused status of 
the divine will immediately precede and immediately follow a statement of the 
divine command ethical principle: 
The same reply should be given to those who ask: Why did God let 
Adam fall, and why did He create us all tainted with the same sin, 
when He might have kept Adam safe, and might have created us of 
other material, or of seed that had first been cleansed? God is He for 
Whose will no cause or ground may be laid down as its rule and standard; 
for nothing is on a level with it or above it, but it is itself the rule for 
all things. If any rule or standard, or cause or ground, existed for it, it 
could no longer be the will of God. What God wills is not right because 
He ought, or was bound, so to will; on the contrary, what takes place 
must be right, because He so wills it. Causes and grounds are laid down 
for the will of the creature, but not for the will of the Creator ... 15 
This text of Luther was subsequently quoted by Jerome Zanchius in The Doctrine 
of Absolute Predestination in his assertion of the position that "the will of God 
is so the cause of all things, as to be itself without cause."16 The juxtaposition 
of an assertion of the divine command thesis with a description of the divine 
will as uncaused is again in evidence in John Calvin's Institutes of the Christian 
Religion. At one point in the text, it is after warning "how sinful it is to insist 
on knowing the causes of the divine will, since it is itself ... the cause of all 
that exists" that Calvin goes on to affirm that "the will of God is the supreme 
rule of righteousness, so that everything which he wills must be held to be 
righteous by the mere fact of his willing it. "17 
The Puritan theologian and divine command moralist, John Preston, explicitly 
appeals to God's status as both first cause and uncaused cause in the treatise 
Life Eternal!. Preston is noteworthy for his attempt to introduce argumentative 
rigor into the line of thought we have been considering, as well as for his way 
of construing the relationship between God's causal status and the realm of ethics: 
The next Attribute . .. is this: That God is the first without all causes, 
having his being and beginning from himselfe. 
Now we come to application. 
Use I. If the Lord be without all cause, this we may gather then, that 
he doth not will any thing, because it is just, or desire it, because it is 
good, or love any thing, because it is pleasant; for there is no cause 
without him, all perfection is in him originally. The creatures indeed 
desire things, because they are good, and love them, because they are 
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pleasant; because they seek for perfection out of themselves, because 
they are caused by that which is out of themselves: but this is not so 
in God, who is the first cause, because, of the first cause there is no 
cause; and of the first reason there is no reason to be given .... I 
speake this for this end, that in our judging of the waies of God, wee 
should take heed of framing a model of our owne, as to thinke, because 
such a thing is just, therefore the Lord wils it: ... we forget this, that 
every thing is just because he wils it; it is not that God wils it, because 
it is good or just. 18 
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Preston seems to reason in the following way. God is the first cause. God's 
status as first cause implies that God is uncaused, that is, that God cannot be 
causally affected by anything. If God were to choose something because he 
perceived it to possess goodness or justice, then God would be causally affected 
by something external to himself, which is impossible. Therefore, it is not the 
case that God wills something because it is good or just; rather, something is 
good or just because God wills it. In An Exposition of the Symbole or Creed of 
the Apostles, the Puritan theologian William Perkins is also found to articulate 
an ethics of divine commands within the framework of comments on the uncaused 
nature of the divine will similar to those of Preston. 19 
II 
While the appeal to God's causal powers represents one strain in the defense 
of the divine command theory, it is by no means the only aspect of the divine 
nature to which this ethical position has been related. One can find yet other 
historical arguments which have the form of showing that an ethics of divine 
commands is compatible or consistent with some established attribute of God 
whereas rejection of this theory is not. 
This strategy is employed by John Preston in Life Eternal!, in contending that 
an ethics of divine commands is required to preserve God's impeccability. His 
argument is straightforward and succinct: 
... we should finde out what the will of God is; for that is the rule of 
justice and equity; for otherwise it was possible that the Lord could 
erre,20 though he did never erre: that which goes by a rule, though it 
doth not swarve, yet it may; but if it be the rule itselfe, it is impossible 
to erre. 21 
Of the same ilk is a line of argument recorded by Ralph Cudworth which 
involves the divine omnipotence. In describing the divine command position in 
a Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, Cudworth claims that 
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"this doctrine hath been since chiefly promoted and advanced by such as think 
nothing so essential to the Deity, as uncontrollable power and arbitrary will, and 
therefore that God could not be God if there should be any thing evil in its own 
nature which he could not do . . . . "22 
The argument which Cudworth reports might be unpacked in the following 
way. Omnipotence is one of the essential or defining properties of God; or, in 
other words, "Necessarily, God is omnipotent." Now let us suppose that an 
ethics of divine commands is a false theory and that there is something, x, which 
is evil in its own nature entirely apart from a divine prohibition. If this is so, 
then God, being good, cannot do x. But then, if God cannot do x, God is not 
omnipotent-which is impossible. In other words, the rejection of the divine 
command position seems to lead us into the unacceptable position of denying 
the divine omnipotence. An ethics of divine commands, on the other hand, 
respects God's omnipotence, for if God can make anything right which he wants 
to, then there is nothing which he is morally prevented from doing. 23 
Cudworth himself is not a proponent, but a vociferous critic of the divine 
command position. Thus one can ask the question of how accurately he reports 
the actual thinking of divine command moralists. 
A number of medievalists have suggested a connection between adherence to 
an ethics of divine commands and exaltation of the divine omnipotence in the 
case of William Ockham. This explanation for Ockham's favorable disposition 
towards the divine command theory has been offered in papers by David Clark,24 
Francis Oakley, 25 and Oakley and Elliot Urdang. 26 It has also been suggested by 
Frederick Copleston in his history of philosophy. 27 This explanation for the 
espousal of an ethics of divine commands may seem intuitively plausible, for 
God's postulated institution of morality surely represents an aspect of what God 
has the power to do. In the case of Ockham, however, this explanation turns 
out to be purely speculative from a strict textual point of view. In reviewing the 
texts which serve as evidence for Ockham's adherence to a divine command 
theory,28 one can see that they do not contain any deduction of divine command 
ethics from the concept of divine omnipotence, nor any explicit argument for 
an ethics of divine commands which involves the notion of divine omnipotence. 
Further, the connection in question is not suggested by the larger context of 
discussion. Ockham's statements of the divine command position do not occur 
within questions dealing with the divine power. 
Among historical divine command moralists, the best textual evidence we 
have found for the postulated connection between an ethics of divine com-
mands and God's omnipotence occurs in the work of Ockham's disciple Gabriel 
Biel, specifically, in his commentary on the Sentences, Book I, distinction 
forty-three: 
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He shows of omnipotence, by what it is directed. He determines how 
far it is extended. 
And the text can be summarized as follows: 
First conclusion: God can do many things which he does not will, 
and he can forego many things which he does, and yet his will can be 
neither different nor new nor changeable. 
Second conclusion: Although what God does or foregoes he justly 
does and foregoes, yet if he were to do or forego in a different manner, 
he would do or forego these things justly. 
Third conclusion: Not things themselves, but the divine will is the 
first rule of all justice and rectitude. 
First Question 
Could God do things which he neither has done nor will do? 
For the fourth article we have the conclusion responding to the ques-
tion: God can do, to some extent or in some way, what he does not do, 
and can produce things in a different way than he does. This is clear 
because he contingently causes things; therefore he can both cause 
something and not bring it about, in one particular way or in another 
manner. 
Corollary: God can do something which is not just for God to do; 
yet if he were to do it, it would be just that this be done. Wherefore 
the divine will alone is the first rule of all justice, and because he wills 
something to be done, it is just that it be done, and because he wills 
something not to be done, it is not just that it be done. 29 
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In this case, the statement of divine command theory occurs within the framework 
of consideration of God's attribute of omnipotence specifically. Biel interprets 
the text of Lombard as presenting this theory, and himself endorses it as a 
consequence drawn from a particular claim about what God has the power to 
do. In section V we will consider further the implications of this connection for 
the acceptability of a divine command ethical system. 
III 
In his treatise On Lm",·s and God the Lawgiver the Renaissance scholastic 
Francisco Suarez provides an account of the debate then taking place over an 
ethics of divine commands. In a discussion of the position that "certain actions 
are so intrinsically bad of their very nature, that their wickedness in no way 
depends upon eternal prohibition ... nor upon the divine will" and, con com it-
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antIy, of the position that "other actions are so essentially good and upright that 
their possession of these qualities is in no sense dependent upon any external 
cause, "30 Suarez gives the following report of the foundation of such a view: 
Briefly, the underlying reason for such a view is that moral actions have 
their own intrinsic character and immutable essence, which in no way 
depend upon any external cause or will, any more than does the essence 
of other things which in themselves involve no contradiction, as I at 
present assume from the science of metaphysics." 
What is significant about Suarez's report is that the rejection of the divine 
command position is connected with the metaphysical issue of the status of the 
essences, morality being treated as one instance of this more general problem. 
This is a strain which recurs in discussions of the divine command theory in 
modem philosophy. Ralph Cudworth, George Rust, and Richard Price all 
explicitly connect morality, and the rejection of a divine command theory, with 
the status of essences and truths as independent of divine decree. 32 
On the other hand, it is well known that Descartes maintained the divine 
creation of the essences and eternal truths,33 and a connection between such a 
position and the espousal of an ethics of divine commands is drawn by Cudworth 
in a Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality: 
But some there are that will still contend, that though it should be 
granted that moral good and evil, just and unjust do not depend upon 
any created will, yet notwithstanding they must needs depend upon the 
arbitrary will of God, because the natures and essences of all things, 
and consequently all verities and falsities, depend upon the same. For 
if the natures and essences of things should not depend upon the will 
of God, it would follow from hence, that something that was not God 
was independent upon God. 
And this is plainly asserted by that ingenious philosopher Renatus 
Descartes . . .34 
Important to note is the contention that there cannot be anything which is inde-
pendent to God. For in A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals, Richard 
Price also makes mention of the issue whether "we must give up the unalterable 
natures of right and wrong, and make them dependent on the Divine will" in 
order to avoid "setting up something distinct from God, which is independent 
of him, and equally eternal and necessary."35 
The suggested contention that a divine command theory must be adopted in 
the realm of ethics because there cannot be anything independent of God may 
be seen, we believe, as an attempt to capture the religious insight of the absolute 
centrality which God is to enjoy. As such, it bears some analogy to a point made 
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in favor of the divine command position by Robert Merrihew Adams, namely, 
that such a system satisfies the religious requirement that God be the supreme 
focus of one's loyalties.'" 
IV 
An ethics of divine commands was a major topic of discussion in late medieval 
philosophy and theology,17 and E. Pluzanski has hypothesized two reasons for 
the attractiveness of this theory to the medieval mentality. On the one hand, he 
connects the espousal of an ethics of divine commands with the unwillingness 
of medieval theologians to take liberties in interpreting Scripture, which contains 
accounts of actions which clearly seem to contradict moral laws and which yet 
are presented as accomplished under the direct order of God. 's This postulated 
connection is verified by the use made, within the medieval divine command 
tradition, of such Scriptural cases as Abraham sacrificing Isaac, the prophet 
Hosea committing adultery, the Israelites despoiling (and hence stealing from) 
the Egyptians on their way out of Egypt, Samson killing himself, Jacob lying 
to his father, and the patriarchs practicing polygamy.39 Secondly, Pluzanski 
suggests that the structure of civil society in the Middle Ages, in particular, the 
large number of special regulations admitted by customary and canon law, pre-
pared the way for acceptance of the idea of an arbitrary moral law. 40 
At first blush, Pluzanski's second suggestion appears to be a sociological and 
psychological thesis of a highly speculative character. On closer examination, 
one can see in Pluzanski's comment the suggestion that an analogical mode of 
reasoning with respect to legislative activity may underlie the position of the 
divine command moralist. 
From this point of view, it is worth taking note of an argument reported by 
Thomas Bradwardine in The Cause of God on the side of the divine command 
theory: 
This could be confirmed by human ecclesiastical laws, and even by 
secular ones. For frequently in ecclesiastical laws the Pope says, "It 
pleased us thus, or so," which, from that very fact, is established for 
a law and is obligatory. Imperial laws too very often have a similar 
foundation, wherefore they also say, "What has pleased the sovereign 
has the force of law." But so is God free in establishing laws for 
governing his whole state, just as these are for his state. Therefore the 
will of God is sufficient for law, and the highest law. 41 
This argument works with a comparison between civil and ecclesiastical law and 
divine legislative activity. From the realm of civil law , it makes use of a statement 
in the code of Justinian, "What has pleased the sovereign has the force of law. "42 
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When reporting arguments in favor of the view that justice as found among 
created things depends simply upon the divine will, Thomas Aquinas mentions 
precisely the same text from the Justinian code as supposed evidence that law 
is "nothing but the expression of the will of a sovereign. "43 Thus the argument 
reported by Bradwardine can be interpreted as claiming that civil law can be, 
and indeed frequently is constituted by the mere will of the ruler. Further, 
according to this argument, the same thing holds true in the realm of ecclesiastical 
law, since papal legislation is often formulated in the terminology of "It pleased 
us thusly." Having established a connection between law and will, the argument 
proceeds by way of analogy. Just as the pope is governor of the spiritual realm 
and just as a civil ruler governs a political state, so God governs all of creation 
as his "state." And hence, just as an ecclesiastical or civil ruler has the power 
to make law by sheer choice of will, so it must be the case that the will of God 
is enough to create law in those matters appropriate to divine legislative activity. 
One can also find medieval arguments for an ethics of divine commands which 
draw an analogy between metaphysics and ethics. An analogy between the 
metaphysical notion of God as "first being" and the ethical notion of God as 
"first good" forms the basis of the argument initially presented in favor of a 
divine command theory by Andrew of Neufchateau44 in his commentary on the 
first book of the Sentences, distinction forty-eight, question one: 
(I) As the "first being" is related to other beings, so is the "first 
good" to other goods. 
(2) The "first being" is the contingent and free cause of all other 
beings, and that on account of which each being is such a being. 
(3) Therefore, the "first good," that is, God, is the contingent and 
free cause of all other goods, and that on account of which 
each good is such a good. 45 
The use of the concept of causality in this argument is noteworthy. In the course 
of his discussion of the divine command theory, Andrew employs causal ter-
minology too often for its occurrence to be purely accidental. Andrew speaks 
of "the first cause and rule of goodness,"46 of the "first cause and reason of 
good, "47 and of the "first cause and rule and measure of rectitude. "4H On several 
occasions the causal force in morals is explicitly identified with God. Andrew 
states that "the rectitude of human action and reason and of the dictate and law 
of nature are reduced to the rectitude of the divine will and proceed from it 
causally .... "49 Or again, he describes God as "the effective and the final and 
as if the formal and the exemplary and the regulative and the measuring cause 
of this [moral] good. "50 The significance of such causal terminology is an issue 
which will be taken up in section V. 
The same strategy of establishing an analogy between what obtains in 
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metaphysics and what obtains in ethics is employed and indeed ingeniously 
exploited by Peter of Ailly in taking the familiar medieval cosmological argument 
fort he existence of God and constructing an analogue of it supporting an ethics 
of divine commands. Ailly's version of the cosmological proof is divided into 
three stages: firstly, an argument that it is necessary to reach one first efficient 
cause; secondly, establishment of the contention that no created thing can serve 
this function; and thirdly, an argument that the first efficient cause is to be 
identified with the divine will. The analogous proof of divine command ethics 
likewise involves three steps. Through rejection of the possibility of an infinite 
regress in obligatory laws, Ailly argues for the necessity of one first obligatory 
law; he then contends that no created law enjoys this status for the reason that 
no created law has from itself the power of binding; finally, using the divine 
attribute of perfection and Augustine's definition of eternal law, he establishes 
that the first obligatory law is the divine will. Given the enduring popularity of 
the cosmological argument, Ailly's extrapolation of it into the realm of ethics 
is sufficiently intriguing to merit quoting the text of the argument in its entirety: 
Thus the first conclusion is this: Just as the divine will is the first 
efficient cause in the class of efficient cause, so, in the class of obligatory 
law, it is the first law or rule. Now the first part of this conclusion is 
commonly granted by all philosophers; therefore it is assumed as some-
thing evident. But in order to prove the second part, I must first advance 
some preliminary propositions. 
The first proposition is that, among obligatory laws, one is a law 
absolutely first. 
Proof: Just as there is not an infinite regress in efficient causes, as the 
Philosopher proves in Metaphysics II, 3; so there is not an infinite 
regress in obligatory laws. Therefore, just as it is necessary to reach 
one first efficient cause, so it is necessary to arrive at one first obligatory 
law, because the principle is entirely the same in both cases. Therefore, 
etc. 
The second proposition is that no created law is absolutely first. 
Proof: Just as no created thing has of itself the power of creating, so 
no created law has of itself the power of binding; for as the Apostle 
states in Romans 13, "There is no power except from God," etc .. 
Therefore, just as no created thing is the first efficient cause, so no 
created law is the first obligatory law; for just as "first cause" is a sign 
that it is God who is involved in the causal activity, so "first law" is 
an indication that it is God who is imposing the obligation. Therefore, 
etc .. 
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The third proposition is that the divine will is the law which is absolutely 
first. 
Proof: 
Evidently by the two preceding propositions. 
Just as it is ascribed to the divine will to be the first efficient cause, so it 
must be ascribed to the same thing to be the first obligatory law; for just as 
the former belongs to perfection, so does the latter. Therefore, etc. 
Furthermore, this proposition is demonstrated by Augustine in Against 
Faustus 22, where he states that the eternal law is the divine intellect or 
will commanding that the natural order be maintained and forbidding that 
it be disturbed. Now the eternal law is a law absolutely first; similarly, 
nothing is prior to the divine will. Therefore, etc .. 
And thus the second part of the conclusion is evident. 
This line of argument is presented by Peter of Ailly in his introductory commentary 
on the first book of the Sentences. 51 
Ailly's contemporaries did not let this argument pass without criticism, and 
Ailly defended it against a variety of objections: (1) that there is afirst obligatory 
law only in the sense of priority of time of institution,52 and concomitantly, that 
a created law could be first in this sense;53 (2) that it is in effect a category 
mistake to connect the fact of being an obligatory law with the concept of 
perfection;54 (3) that the divine will is not, strictly speaking, the eternal law , but 
rather, is the eternal maker of law;55 (4) that the divine will is not absolutely the 
first law or rule because negative laws (such as "Do not steal") are not derived 
from it;56 and (5) that the status of a law or rule is inappropriately assigned to 
the divine faculty of will. 57 It is Ailly's response to this last objection which is 
the most interesting philosophically, in articulating a version of the divine com-
mand theory based on the concept of the divine simplicity, and hence on the 
identity of will and intellect in God. 58 
Peter of Ailly also makes mention of the analogy between the divine will as 
first efficient cause and as first obligatory law in his treatise Is the Church of 
Peter Regulated by Law? 59 A possible precursor of Ailly's argument is to be 
found in a line of argument recorded in Thomas Bradwardine's The Cause of 
God. Although lacking an explicit analogy with a cosmological form of argument 
for God's existence, the argument reported by Bradwardine is like Ailly's argu-
ment in contending that there cannot be an infinite regress in the rules of justice, 
that the rule which is the highest of all and the origin of the other rules cannot 
be in some creature, and that this highest law is the divine will. 60 
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Surely, one of the purposes of studying the history of philosophy is to gain 
insight into problems we are still grappling with today. In addition to providing 
examples of a positive strategy of defense for an ethics of divine commands, 
there are yet other respects in which the arguments we have just presented make 
a contribution to the current discussion of the divine command theory. 
In the contemporary literature the most familiar division among divine command 
ethical systems is that between metaethical and normative theories. Philip Quinn 
has attempted to distinguish yet other forms which an ethics of divine commands 
might assume. In Divine Commands and Moral Requirements he investigates 
divine command theories based on logical relations such as strict equivalence: 
It is necessary that, for all p, it is required that p if and only if God 
commands that p. 
N(Vp(Rp=Cp» . 
It is necessary that, for all p, it is permitted that p if and only if it is 
not the case that God commands that not-po 
N(Vp(Pp=-C-p». 
It is necessary that, for all p, it is forbidden that p if and only if God 
commands that not-po 
N(Vp(Fp=C-p».61 
In a subsequent paper Quinn sets out "to explore a somewhat different terrain,"62 
formulating a causal normative theory: 
For every proposition which is such that it is logically possible that God 
commands that p and it is logically contingent that p, a sufficient causal 
condition that it is obligatory that p is that God commands that p, and 
a necessary causal condition that it is obligatory that p is that God 
commands that p. 
For every proposition which is such that it is logically possible that God 
commands that p and it is logically contingent that p, a sufficient causal 
condition that it is forbidden that p is that God commands that not-p, 
and a necessary causal condition that it is forbidden that p is that God 
commands that not-p. 
For every proposition which is such that it is logically possible that God 
commands that p and it is logicall y contingent that p, a sufficient causal 
condition that it is permitted that p is that it is not the case that God 
commands that not-p, and a necessary causal condition that it is permitted 
that p is that it is not the case that God commands that not _p. 63 
According to Quinn, the attempt to construe the relation between divine com-
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mands and moral duty in causal terms is meant to incorporate a view held by at 
least some divine command moralist which the logical formulations of the theory 
fail to embody. Specifically, it is meant to capture an intuitive picture of God 
as an agent bringing about or creating moral obligations and prohibitions by 
means of his legislative activity. 64 
Our historical study shows that there is more to Quinn's proposed causal 
version of divine command theory than he recognized. In making this proposal 
he is in fact resurrecting an historically established conceptual framework for 
articulating an ethics of divine commands. Andrew of Neufchateau, the paradig-
matic divine command moralists of the Middle Ages,65 uses causal terminology 
in his statement and discussion of the theory. Further, an appeal to God's status 
as first and uncaused cause is a strain running through the discussion and defense 
of the theory in medieval philosophical theology, Reformation theology, and 
Puritan theology. And the medieval divine command moralist Peter of Ailly saw 
in the divine will's status as first efficient cause an analogy for God's status in 
the realm of morality. 
An ethics of divine commands has not infrequently been perceived as a theory 
which reduces ethics to a matter of power. As we have already noted, the 
seventeenth century British philosopher Ralph Cudworth asserts that "this doctrine 
hath been since chiefly promoted and advanced by such as think nothing so 
essential to the Deity, as uncontrollable power and arbitrary will, and therefore 
that God could not be God if there should be any thing evil in its own nature 
which he could not do . . . ."66 Another historical critic of divine command 
ethics, Thomas Chubb, saw proponents of the theory as reduced to adopting the 
unpalatable position of Hobbes, that is, of grounding God's authority in his 
absolute power.67 In the contemporary literature, D. Goldstick has claimed that 
a theist is in the position of affirming, with respect to any divinely willed code 
of behavior, that "its moral rightness follows necessarily from its being willed 
by somebody omnipotent. "68 Or again, Philip Quinn has described varieties of 
divine command theory which "have it that God's commands are to be obeyed 
just because he is supremely powerful. "69 
Tying the divine command theory to the divine omnipotence has occasioned 
severe criticism of it. As representative of this critique, we quote Anthony Flew: 
But a price has to be paid for thus making God's will your standard. 
. . . you simultaneously lay yourself wide open to the charge that your 
religion is a gigantic exercise in eternity-serving, a worship of Infinite 
power as such, a glorification of Omnipotent Will quite regardless of 
the content of that will. It takes a very clear head-and a very strong 
stomach-to maintain such a position openly, consistently, and without 
any attempt to burk its harsh consequences. 70 
While it cannot be denied that the divine omnipotence has entered into the articu-
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lation and defense of an ethics of divine commands, study of the historical litera-
ture does serve to indicate that the notions of God's omnipotence and of his power 
over us have not constituted the only considerations offered in support of the divine 
command theory, nor have they dominated the discussion. The theory has also 
been related to other divine attributes, such as God's impeccability. It has been 
related to the religious insight of the absolute centrality of God, expressed as the 
view that there cannot be anything which is independent of God. There have been 
attempts to use human legislative activity as a model for the divine. And attempts 
have been made to defend divine command ethics through notions taken from the 
realm of metaphysics, specifically, by invoking God's status as first and uncaused 
cause, by drawing an analogy between "being" and "goodness," and by con-
structing an ethical analogue of the cosmological argument for God's existence. 
Thus someone inclined to adopt an ethics of divine commands need not fear being 
automatically committed to a doctrine of "Might makes right."71 
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